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INTRODUCTION

E

xploration and collection of marine genetic resources (“MGRs”)
has led to the identification of more than 15,000 molecules.1 As a
result of these discoveries, the number of international claims for marine
gene patents deposited between 1991 and 2009 reached 677, and dozens
of products based on deep-sea organisms have been patented.2 With 95%
of marine gene patent claims filed after 2000, the growth of the field can
be considered a recent phenomenon.3
Deep-sea marine organisms (bacteria, animals, plants, seaweeds, etc.)
live in particular environments that do not have a close equivalent in terrestrial ecosystems. These organisms can resist, for example, high pressure, elevated temperature, and the absence of sunlight.4 Due to such
unique characteristics, MGRs deriving from such organisms have shown
great potential in the field of medicine and are considered of significant
value for future research and developments. Potential fields of application for MGRs include antioxidant, antifungal, anti-HIV, antibiotic, anticancer, antituberculosis, and antimalarial uses.5 Major pharmaceutical
firms, including Merck, Lilly, Pfizer, Hoffman-Laroche, and BristolMyers Squibb, have marine biology departments.6 At least nine companies are currently involved in research and development of biotechnology on MGRs.7 The global market for marine biotechnology was estimated at $2.4 billion in 2004, with an estimated average growth of 5.9% per
year from 1999 to 2007.8 According to the results of International Census
1. Kirsten E. Zewers, Bright Future for Marine Genetic Resources, Bleak Future for
Settlement of Ownership Rights: Reflections on the United Nations Law of the Sea Consultative Process on Marine Genetic Resources, 5 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 151, 152
(2008) (citing U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Rep of the Secretary-General, ¶ 127, U.N. Doc. A/62/66 (Mar. 12, 2007)).
2. Sophie Arnaud-Haond, Jesús M. Arrieta, & Carlos M. Duarte, Global Genetic
Resources: Marine Biodiversity and Gene Patents, 331 SCIENCE 1521, 1521 (Mar. 25,
2011).
3. Id.
4. Sergio Beslier, The Protection and Sustainable Exploitation of Genetic Resources
of the High Seas from the European Union’s Perspective, 24 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL
L. 335 (2009).
5. Fernando de la Calle, Marine Genetic Resources: A Source of New Drugs: The
Experience of the Biotechnology Sector, 24 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 209 (2009).
6. Zewers, supra note 1, at 156–58.
7. Resources, MARINEBIOTECH.ORG, http://www.marinebiotech.org/links.html (last
visited Oct. 22, 2011).
8. Douglas Westwood Ltd., Marine Industries Global Market Analysis, 1 MARINE
FORESIGHT
SERIES
117
(2005),
available
at
http://www.marine.ie/NR/rdonlyres/B66FBE34-3859-4FA8-9ABF8C8558CDB15E/0/ForesightSeries1_global_market_analysis.pdf.
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of Marine Microbes, “the value of the ecosystem services provided by
coral reefs is estimated at more than $5 million per square kilometer per
year, in terms of revenues from genetic material and bioprospecting.”9
Bioprospecting refers to the “scientific investigation of living organisms
for commercially valuable genetic and biochemical resources”10 and includes the research, collection, and utilization of biological and genetic
resources with the aim of applying the derived knowledge for scientific
and/or commercial purposes.11
Despite the field’s growth, claims associated with marine genes have
so far originated from only thirty-one countries in the world, and 90% of
the deposited patents arise only from ten counties, with 70% from the
United States, Germany, and Japan.12 This is because scientific research
related to deep seabed and high seas genetic resources is restricted to
those few operators who have the necessary technological capacity and
financial resources. Up to now, few countries have produced the necessary capital, technology, and scientific expertise to obtain MGRs. Due to
the high costs involved, developed countries enjoy an effective monopoly on the necessary elements for research, and subsequently on the
MGRs that they collect.13
From a legal point of view, it is unclear under which regime MGRs fall
and under what conditions they can be patented. Three main legal instruments contribute to the parameters of their legal regime: the United

9. U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Rep of the SecretaryGeneral, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. A/62/66 (Mar. 12, 2007) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General,
Oceans Rep.]. More than 2,700 scientists, from 80 different countries, put 10 years effort
together in order to realize the most precise and reliable census of marine life. For more
information on marine life, discovery and research, see CENSUS OF MARINE LIFE,
http://www.coml.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
10. Louise A. de La Fayette, A New Regime for the Conservation and Sustainable
Use of Marine Biodiversity and Genetic Resources Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 24 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 221, 228 (2009); Andree Kirchner, Bioprospecting, Marine Scientific Research and the Patentability of Genetic Resources, in
SERVING THE RULE OF INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR
DAVID JOSEPH ATTARD 119 (Norman A. Martínez Gutiérrez ed., 2010).
11. K. TEN KATE & S.A. LAIRD, THE COMMERCIAL USE OF BIODIVERSITY 19 (1999).
12. Arnaud-Haond et al., supra note 2, at 1521.
13. SALVATORE ARICO & CHARLOTTE SALPIN, BIOPROSPECTING OF GENETIC
RESOURCES IN THE DEEP SEABED: SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL AND POLICY ASPECTS 15 (U.N. Univ.
&
Inst.
of
Advanced
Studies
2005),
available
at
http://www.ias.unu.edu/binaries2/DeepSeabed.pdf; David Leary, International Law and
Genetic Resources of the Deep Sea, in LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE FOR OCEANS IN
GLOBALISATION 353 (Davor Vidas ed., 2010); de La Fayette, supra note 10, at 277.
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Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”),14 the Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”),15 and the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (“TRIPS”).16 As a preliminary remark, it
must be highlighted that while UNCLOS does not specifically address
MGRs, it does provide that the deep seabed, as it lies beyond national
jurisdiction, is subject to the common heritage of mankind regime,17
managed by the International Seabed Authority (“the Authority”).18
However, the water column beyond national jurisdiction is part of the
high seas regime and subject to the freedoms of the high seas, e.g., inter
alia the freedoms of navigation and of scientific research.19 There is considerable disagreement as to whether MGRs are or should be included in
the Authority’s jurisdiction and whether they come under the “common
heritage of mankind” regime.
Even if MGRs are not directly part of the common heritage regime,
their conservation and exploitation constitute common concerns because
they are located in areas beyond national jurisdiction. MGRs should
therefore enjoy protection in line with the existing legal instruments concerning common interests, such as biodiversity and genetic resources for
food and agriculture. In this light, this Article suggests that the exploitation of MGRs should be carried out according to two fundamental principles that are enshrined in the CBD: (i) the prior and informed consent
to access to MGRs and (ii) the fair and equitable sharing of benefits from
these resources.
It stands to question whether the existing international regulation of intellectual property rights (“IPRs”), specifically patents, as set out by
TRIPS, is compatible with these two principles and, more generally, with
the complex legal regime of MGRs. According to TRIPS, the grant of
patents is conditioned on technical requirements, none of which concern
the prior and informed consent to access and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits. Given this lack of consistency between legal regimes, the
World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) Doha Ministerial Declaration
charged the TRIPS Council with the task of examining the relationship

14. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
15. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter
CBD].
16. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, 869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
17. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 136.
18. Id. art. 137, ¶ 2.
19. Id. art. 87.
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between TRIPS and the CBD.20 A group of fifty-two WTO members
seemed to have reached a compromise in July 2008 when it agreed to
implement a “disclosure of origin clause,” i.e., the grant of a patent conditioned on disclosure of the source of the material upon which the invention is based, as a requirement for patent application.21 Such an
amendment would have important implications on MGRs exploitation,
since the grant of patents would be subject to the CBD principles, which
are, in our view, jointly with UNCLOS ones, the principles framing the
MGRs legal regime. However, the amendment’s current feasibility is
definitively uncertain, due to the subsequent regression in the negotiations.
In view of these three overlapping legal regimes, any attempt at regulating the management and the exploitation of MGRs stands within the
wider debate on the fragmentation of international law.22 This Article
will demonstrate that the different legal regimes likely operate in support
of one another to create a workable legal regime for MGRs. Compatibility clauses and recent normative developments in each regime testify to
an interdependent relationship between UNCLOS, the CBD, and TRIPS.
In short, legal quarrels relating to the management and exploitation of
MGRs illustrate an inter-systemic dialogue and the need of such dialogue
in order to form a coherent legal framework for MGRs.23

20. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 19,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
21. Trade Negotiations Comm., Draft Modalities for TRIPS Related Issues,
T/NC/W52 (July 18, 2008).
22. On this topic, see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006); Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The
Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law,
60 STAN. L. REV. 595 (2007); Benedetto Conforti, Unité et fragmentation du droit international: “glissez, mortels, n’appuyez pas!” [Unity and Fragmentation of International
Law: “Thus Lightly Touch and Quickly Go!”], 111 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 5 (2007) (Fr.); Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner,
Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global
Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004); Duncan French, Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 300 (2006). See generally
Symposium, Post-ILC Debate on Fragmentation of International Law, 17 FINNISH Y.B.
INT’L L. (2006); Tullio Treves, Fragmentation of International Law: the Judicial Perspective, 23 COMUNICAZIONI E STUDI 821 (2007).
23. On the interdependence and theoretical debates of legal regimes, see generally
Lorenzo Gradoni, Systèmes juridiques internationaux: une esquisse [International Legal
Systems: A Sketch], in LA CIRCULATION DES CONCEPTS JURIDIQUES: LE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL DE L’ENVIRONNEMENT ENTRE MONDIALISATION ET FRAGMENTATION 27
(Hélène Ruiz Fabri & Lorenzo Gradoni eds., 2009) (Fr.); Bruno Simma, Self-Contained
Regimes, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 111 (1985); Bruno Simma & Dirk Pyulkowski, Of
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The following analysis is divided into two sections. The first part aims
at identifying the principles and rules governing MGRs’ overall legal
regime by demonstrating how the management and exploitation of
MGRs falls within several legal systems. It analyzes (A) the legal status
of MGRs in the light of UNCLOS, (B) the patentability of inventions
derived from MGRs in the light of TRIPS, and (C) MGRs’ access and
commercial exploitation in the light of the CBD. It concludes that existing instruments, if considered and applied in isolation, are incomplete
and inefficient to deal with MGRs. The second part explores alternative
legal solutions as well as institutional mechanisms of coping with the
management of MGRs. To this extent, it will analyze four legal solutions
based on the joint application of existing legal tools, and three possible
institutional scenarios that guarantee the principles of protection and the
“common” management of MGRs.
I. A LEGAL REGIME FOR MGRS: FRAGMENTATION AND COORDINATION
BETWEEN EXISTING REGIMES

A. The Applicability and Limitations of UNCLOS
UNCLOS was adopted by the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea on December 10, 1982, and entered into force on November 16, 1994.24 Currently, 161 states are party to UNCLOS. Considered the “Constitution for the oceans,” UNCLOS, as declared by the
U.N. General Assembly and repeatedly confirmed by states, “sets out the
legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must
be carried out.”25 Thus, it is imperative to identify where MGRs fall under UNCLOS provisions, considering the related context and subsequent
practice.26
UNCLOS does not contain any provision explicitly regulating MGRs
and it does not use the expression “area beyond national jurisdiction.”27
Rather, it provides that areas beyond the national jurisdiction of coastal
states are either part of the high seas regime or of the “Area of the deep
seabed.” Article 86 stipulates that “[t]he provisions of this Part [Part VII
Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 483 (2006).
24. UNCLOS, supra note 14.
25. See Oceans and the Law of the Sea, G.A. Res. 62/215, U.N. Doc. A./RES/62/215
(Dec. 22, 2008).
26. Treaties are “living instruments.” See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 60th Sess.,
May 5–June 6, July 7–Aug. 8, 2008, U.N. Doc. A/63/10; GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 10,
Annex A, at 365 (2008).
27. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 14.
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High Seas] apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a
State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.”28 High seas
are the water column not included in areas submitted to coastal states’
jurisdiction29 and superjacent the Area of the deep seabed and, eventually, the continental shelf.30 The floor and the subsoil of the areas beyond
national jurisdiction fall under the Area31 regulated by Part XI of
UNCLOS.32 This distinction creates one of the elemental problems when
applying UNCLOS to MGRs—their locale is not easily ascertainable.
For instance, how does one determine in which of the two regimes a microbe living in symbiosis with the local fauna falls, or perhaps a microbe
found in the proximity of a thermal vent? It is, however, important to
outline the main characteristics of both regimes in order to foresee the
legal framework that might regulate MGRs and related issues.
“The Area”—the floor and the subsoil of areas beyond national jurisdiction—is subject to the regime of the “common heritage of mankind.”33
The common heritage of mankind was first introduced by the Maltese
representative, Arvid Pardo, in a speech in front of the U.N. General Assembly in 1967.34 In 1970, the General Assembly adopted a resolution,
declaring that “[t]he sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof,
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction . . . as well as the resources of
the area, are the common heritage of mankind.”35 In those years, the optimism concerning technological developments fuelled the rise of a regime promoting a New International Economic Order36 (which conveys
28. Id. art. 86 (emphasis added).
29. Id.
30. Id. art. 76, ¶ 1.
31. The Area is considered the floor and the subsoil of areas beyond national jurisdiction. Id. art. 1, ¶ 1.
32. Id. arts. 133–91.
33. Id. art. 136.
34. U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., 1516th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1516 (Nov. 1,
1967).
35. Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the
Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV), U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2749 (XXV) (Dec. 17, 1970).
36. In the 1960s and 1970s, the countries with newfound independence from their
colonial occupier considered colonialism as an avatar of capitalism. DENIS BENN,
MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY AND THE ECONOMICS OF CHANGE 1–3 (2003). For this reason
they claimed a new international economic order that will help solve the inequalities
between developing and developed states, which translates to the difference between the
new independent states and the former colonial powers. Id.; see also Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The New World Economic Order and Equity, in DYNAMICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 209 (R.K. Dixit & C. Jayaraj eds., 2004).
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the idea of equity in economic relations).37 This is reflected in Article
137 on the legal status of the Area and its resources:
1. No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over
any part of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridical person appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise
of sovereignty or sovereign rights nor such appropriation shall be recognized.
2. All rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a
whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act. These resources are not
subject to alienation.
....
3. No State or natural or juridical person shall claim, acquire or exercise rights with respect to the minerals recovered from the Area except
in accordance with this Part.38

When UNCLOS was negotiated, the only resources in the Area taken
into consideration were mineral resources whose economic potential,
even if exaggerated,39 was of great interest for both developed and developing countries.40 The existence of living resources in the Area and
their possible economic value was unknown at that time. As a result, Article 133 defines resources as “all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed, including polymetallic nodules.”41 This narrow definition of the resources has led some to
posit that the common heritage of mankind regime does not apply to
MGRs.42 Another reason for the nonapplication of the common heritage
regime to MGRs is that the exploitation and management of the resources would be accompanied by the Authority’s position in a leading
37. Luigi Migliorino, Sfruttamento dei fondi marini e nuovo ordine economico internazionale, trasferimento della tecnologia e controllo delle multinazionali [Exploitation of
the Seabed and New International Economic Order, Transfer of Technology and Control
of Multinational Corporations], in LO SFRUTTAMENTO DEI FONDI MARINI 81, 82 (Tullio
Treves et al. eds., 1982) (It.); Jutta Brunnée, Common Areas, Common Heritage and
Common Concern, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
550, 561–62 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).
38. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 137.
39. Lyle Glowka, Evolving Perspectives on the International Seabed Area’s Genetic
Resources: Fifteen Years after the “Deepest of Ironies,” in LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND
SCIENCE, supra note 13, at 397; DAVID LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GENETIC
RESOURCES OF THE DEEP SEA 47 (2007).
40. Migliorino, supra note 37, at 84–85.
41. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 133(a).
42. LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LAW & DEEP SEA GENETIC RESOURCES, supra note 39, at
47.
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role, but the Authority features a composition that is potentially ill-suited
for the management of MGRs.43 The principal organ of the Authority, the
Council, is composed of member states’ representatives, in particular
those states that have a leading role in the polymetallic nodules industry.44 These groups may lack sufficient motivation or qualifications to
protect MGRs and the related industry.
Despite Part XI’s narrow definition of resources within the purposes of
the common heritage regime, the limited language does not preclude Part
XI and the Authority from governing MGRs. Applicable portions are
43. Tullio Treves, Principles and Objectives of the Legal Regime Governing Areas
Beyond Nation Jurisdiction, in THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME OF AREAS BEYOND
NATIONAL JURISDICTION: CURRENT AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 7, 17–18 (Erik J. Molenaar & Alex G. Oude Elferink eds., 2010) [hereinafter Treves, Principles and Objectives].
44. Pursuant to Article 161, ¶ 1 of UNCLOS, the Council consists of thirty-six members:
(a) four members from among those States Parties which, during the last five
years for which statistics are available, have either consumed more than [2%]
of total world consumption or have had net imports of more than [2%] of total
world imports of the commodities produced from the categories of minerals to
be derived from the Area, and in any case one State from the Eastern European
(Socialist) region, as well as the largest consumer;
(b) four members from among the eight States Parties which have the largest
investments in preparation for and in the conduct of activities in the Area, either directly or through their nationals, including at least one State from the
Eastern European (Socialist) region;
(c) four members from among States Parties which on the basis of production
in areas under their jurisdiction are major net exporters of the categories of
minerals to be derived from the Area, including at least two developing States
whose exports of such minerals have a substantial bearing upon their economies;
(d) six members from among developing States Parties, representing special interests. The special interests to be represented shall include those of States with
large populations, States which are land-locked or geographically disadvantaged, States which are major importers of the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area, States which are potential producers of such minerals, and
least developed States;
(e) eighteen members elected according to the principle of ensuring an equitable geographical distribution of seats in the Council as a whole, provided that
each geographical region shall have at least one member elected under this
subparagraph. For this purpose, the geographical regions shall be Africa, Asia,
Eastern European (Socialist), Latin America and Western European and Others.
UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 161, ¶ 1.
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found in those provisions concerning marine scientific research and the
preservation of the marine environment in the Area.45 Article 246, applicable in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf, includes marine scientific research projects carried out “in order to increase
scientific knowledge of the marine environment for the benefit of all
mankind” and “of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of
natural resources, whether living or non-living.”46 No provision of
UNCLOS distinguishes between marine scientific research carried out for
commercial purposes on the one hand, and research that does not have direct commercial potential or is not suitable for commercial exploitation on
the other.47 Indeed, bioprospecting—i.e., the research, collection, and
utilization of biological and genetic resources with the aim of applying
the knowledge derived for scientific and/or commercial purposes48—falls
under the notion of “marine scientific research.”49 Therefore, any bioprospecting done in the Area must be performed in compliance with Article
143, which provides:
1. Marine scientific research in the Area shall be carried out exclusively
for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind as a whole, in accordance with Part XIII.
....
3. States Parties may carry out marine scientific research in the Area.
States Parties shall promote international cooperation in marine scientific research in the Area by:
(a) participating in international programmes and encouraging
cooperation in marine scientific research by personnel of different countries and of the Authority;
(b) ensuring that programmes are developed through the Authority or other international organizations as appropriate for
the benefit of developing States and technologically less developed States . . . ;

45. Id. arts. 143, 145.
46. Id. art. 246, ¶¶ 3, 5(a).
47. Tullio Scovazzi, The Seabed Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction: General
and Institutional Aspects, in THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME, supra note 43, at 58
[hereinafter Scovazzi, Seabed Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction].
48. KATE & LAIRD, supra note 11, at 19.
49. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 246.
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(c) effectively disseminating the results of research and analysis when available, through the Authority or other international channels when appropriate.50

Even if MGRs in the Area cannot be considered part of the heritage of
mankind regime,51 they reasonably fall under “common concerns” in the
sense that they are resources in which the majority of states have an interest because of their location—in areas beyond national jurisdiction,
and so potentially exploitable by all states—and are also common because of their potential benefits to mankind.52 To consider MGRs as
common concerns would root the creation of a legal regime, which
would regulate MGRs and their exploitation in the view of protecting
such common concerns for the benefit of mankind.
However, as shown earlier, it is difficult to determine whether an MGR
is located on the seabed or in the water column. Article 143 of UNCLOS
on marine scientific research could be applicable to MGRs located in the
Area and thus govern bioprospecting carried out in the Area, but not in
the water column. Likewise, Article 135 of UNCLOS states that the legal
status of the waters superjacent to the Area and of the air space above
those waters should not be undermined by the regime created by Part
XI.53 In the water column, beyond national jurisdiction, all states enjoy
the freedom of scientific research guaranteed by Articles 87.1(f) and
257.54
50. Id. art. 143.
51. As defined in Id. art. 136.
52. “[c]ertains domaines ne concernent pas les intérêts d’un Etat par rapport aux
autres, mais touchent aux intérêts fondamentaux de la grande majorité des Etats, c’est-àdire – pour ceux qui croient qu’elle existe – aux intérêts de la communauté internationale.” Tullio Scovazzi, La notion de patrimoine culturel de l’humanité dans les instruments internationaux [The Notion of Cultural Heritage of Mankind in International Instruments], in LE PATRIMOINE CULTUREL DE L’HUMANITÉ 3 (James A. R. Nafziger & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 2008) (Fr.).
53. Article 135 of UNCLOS on the legal status of the superjacent waters and air
space states that “[n]either this Part nor any rights granted or exercised pursuant thereto
shall affect the legal status of the waters superjacent to the Area or that of the air space
above those waters.” UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 135.
54. Marine scientific research consists in a multitude of disciplines (biology, geography, geology, physics etc.). UNCLOS specifically regulates marine scientific research in
Part XIII. Id. arts. 235–65. Under UNCLOS, “[a]ll States, irrespective of their geographical location, and competent international organizations have the right to conduct marine
scientific research subject to the rights and duties of other States as provided for in this
Convention.” Id. This right is also guaranteed under Article 87 of UNCLOS, which sets
forth the freedoms of the high seas, including the freedom of scientific research. Id. art.
87; see ROBIN R. CHURCHILL & A. VAUGHAN LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 203 (3d ed.
1999); Marko Pavliha & Norman A. Martínez Gutiérrez, Marine Scientific Research and
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Alternatively, Article 241 applies to both the Area as well as the water
column and provides that “[m]arine scientific research activities shall not
constitute the legal basis for any claim to any part of the marine environment or its resources.”55 The collection of samples for the creation of
biotechnologies could be considered as being in the interest of the
“community.”56 Just like all the activities carried out in areas beyond national jurisdiction, it has to be conducted with regard to the international
community’s interest. This notion is buttressed by UNCLOS’s preamble
stating that:
The States Parties to this Convention . . . will promote the peaceful uses
of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living resources,
Desiring by this Convention to develop the principles embodied in resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970 in which the General Assembly of the United Nations solemnly declared inter alia that the area
of the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction, as well as its resources, are the common heritage of mankind, the exploration and exploitation of which shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States.57

These paragraphs of the Preamble encourage interpreting relevant
UNCLOS provisions to be applied to MGRs. Such sentiment takes inspiration from the common heritage of mankind regime, as embodied in the
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2749.58 However, for a truly complete and uncontested application of Part XI to MGRs, the parties must
agree to an amendment to the Convention. Unfortunately, such an event
would require long negotiations given the disagreements, discussed later,
that prevail with regard to the application of IPRs over biotechnologies.
Before considering the feasibility of an amendment, the regime described above must be examined and interpreted with regard to other relthe 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J.
115 (2010); Alfred H. Soons, Regulation of Marine Scientific Research by the European
Community and its Member States, in 23 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 259, 261 (1992); Alfred
H. Soons, The Legal Regime of Marine Scientific Research: Current Issues, in LAW,
SCIENCE AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT 139 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2007).
55. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 241.
56. Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Les législations nationales pour l’exploitation des
fonds marins et leur incompatibilité avec le droit international [National Laws allowing
for the Exploitation of the Seabed and their Incompatibility with International Law], 24
ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 810, 812 (1978) (Fr.).
57. UNCLOS, supra note 14, pmbl., ¶¶ 5–6.
58. See supra note 35.
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evant instruments, as required by the general rule of interpretation of
treaties set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(“VCLT”).59 Moreover, UNCLOS is a product of its time. It should be
applied in light of the normative evolutions that have occurred since it
was adopted.60 As numerous states are simultaneously party to
UNCLOS, TRIPS, and the CBD, these two latter treaties will be analyzed both separately and jointly.
B. Finding Space for MGRs in TRIPS
1. The Legal Framework of TRIPS
TRIPS was concluded under the auspices of the WTO.61 WTO members states (and parties to the Agreement) number 153 and approximately
130 of them are also contracting parties of UNCLOS.62 Inventions obtained from genetic resources, including MGRs, can be patented according to Part II, Section V of TRIPS, which provides minimum standards
of intellectual property protection.63 TRIPS establishes that “patents shall
59. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
art. 31, ¶ 3(c) [hereinafter VCLT].
60. See supra note 26.
61. TRIPS, supra note 16.
62. Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 1,
2011).
63. On TRIPS, see Carlos M. Correa, Patents Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 227 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 2d ed. 2008); CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2007);
DANIEL J. GERVAIS, L’ACCOR SUR LES ADPIC [THE TRIPS AGREEMENT] (2010) (Fr.);
DANIEL J. GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (3d ed.
2008); MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 699 (2d ed. 2006). The grant
of patents on biotech inventions has given rise to a strong debate between developed and
developing WTO member countries. As we will explain below, it constitutes one of the
main subjects discussed within the Doha Round. The regulation of biotechnologies in
international law and the patentability of biotech inventions have also been examined in
many scholarly writings. See also ENRICO BONADIO, SISTEMA BREVETTUALE TRIPS E
RISORSE GENETICHE: ESIGENZE COMMERCIALI E INTERESSI PUBBLICI [THE TRIPS PATENT
SYSTEM AND GENETIC RESOURCES: TRADE ISSUES AND PUBLIC INTEREST] (Jovene Editore
S.P.A. 2008) (It.); BIOETICA E BIOTECNOLOGIE NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE E
COMUNITARIO: QUESTIONI GENERALI E TUTELA DELLA PROPRIETÀ INTELLETTUALE
[BIOETHICS AND BIOTECHNOLOGIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND EC LAW: GENERAL AND
IP ISSUES] (Nerina Boschiero ed., 2006) (It.) [hereinafter BIOETICA E BIOTECNOLOGIE NEL
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE E COMUNITARIO]; JONATHAN CURCI, THE PROTECTION OF
BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INTELLECTUAL
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be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all
fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive
step and are capable of industrial application.”64 Therefore, patents can
be granted on inventions based on MGRs if these three essential conditions are simultaneously fulfilled. Moreover, as a necessary condition,
applications shall contain invention descriptions sufficiently clear and
complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the
art.65 According to Article 28 of TRIPS, a patent confers on its owner a
series of exclusive rights, including the right to prevent third parties, not
expressly authorized to the contrary, from making, using, offering for
sale, selling, or importing the product or the process covered by patent.
These protections shall not end before twenty years of the filing date.66
Given the patentability of inventions derived from MGRs—such as
pharmaceutical products or processes—which are novel, original, industrial and properly described, the exceptions established by Article 27 of
TRIPS acquire importance in this field. Firstly, Paragraph 2 provides that
member states are allowed to exclude from patentability “inventions the
commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or
morality.”67 Ordre public and morality are composed of mandatory rules,
the application of which cannot be neglected:68 ordre public refers to
those basic values prevailing in society and is meant to include public

PROPERTY 30 (2010); BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Francesco Francioni &
Tullio Scovazzi eds., 2006); BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (Charles R. McManis ed., 2007);
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES (Burton Ong ed., 2004);
RICCARDO PAVONI, BIODIVERSITÀ E BIOTECNOLOGIE NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE E
COMUNITARIO [BIODIVERSITY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC LAW]
(2004) (It.) [hereinafter PAVONI, BIODIVERSITÀ E BIOTECNOLOGIE]. The present study does
not aim at analyzing the whole range of the general controversial issues concerning the
grant of patents on biotech inventions. On the contrary, it will be focused only on the
examination of those aspects specifically concerning the grant of patents on MGRs, taking their special characteristics and their location into consideration.
64. TRIPS, supra note 16, art. 27, ¶ 1.
65. Id. art. 29.
66. Id. art. 33.
67. Correa, Patents Rights, supra note 63, at 229.
68. According to Pierre-Marie Dupuy: “L’indérogeabilité est un attribut conféré à une
norme en raison de son caractère d’ordre public, qu’aucune volonté individuelle ne saurait transcender sans porter du même coup atteinte à la sécurité de l’ensemble du système
et des intérêts collectifs de la société qu’il a à charge de réguler.” Pierre-Marie Dupuy,
L’unité de l’ordre juridique international: Cours général de droit international public
[The Unity of International Law: General Course on Public International Law], in 297
RECUEIL DES COURS. COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 282 (2002) (Neth.).
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safety, the physical integrity of individuals, and the protection of the environment; morality instead is based on ethical norms accepted and deeply rooted in a particular culture.69 Secondly, pursuant to Paragraph 3(a),
members may consider diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for
the treatment of humans and animals as nonpatentable subject matter.70
On the contrary, given the nature of MGRs and the techniques employed,
biotech inventions from MGRs are not affected by Article 27.3(b), which
provides for exceptions to patents on “plants and animals other than micro-organisms”—i.e. a category to which MGRs should not be ascribed—“and essentially biological processes for the production of plants
or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes”—
i.e. techniques different from biotechnologies.71
As mentioned above, TRIPS, like other treaties, must be interpreted in
the light of the general principles on treaty interpretation enshrined in the
VCLT.72 This is important, as it pertains to the grant of patents on inventions based on MGRs, considering that the dispute settlement system of
the WTO “serves . . . to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law”73 and the principles provided in Articles 31 and 32 of the
VCLT74 have attained status of customary international law in the WTO
Appellate Body’s reports.75
Thus, according to Article 31.1 of the VCLT, TRIPS shall be “interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”76
Reference should then be made to Article 7, which sets out objectives
and establishes that the protection and enforcement of IPRs: “should con69. See Angelica Bonfanti, Environmental Risk in Biotech Patent Disputes: Which
Role for Ordre Public before the European Patent Office?, EUR. J. OF RISK REG. (forthcoming); E. Richard Gold, The Ethics of Biotechnological Intellectual Property, in
BIOTECHNOLOGY, IP & ETHICS 15 (E. Richard Gold & Bartha Maria Knoppers eds.,
2009); OLIVER MILLS, BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INVENTIONS: MORAL RESTRAINTS AND PATENT
LAW (2010).
70. Correa, Patents Rights, supra note 63, at 231.
71. TRIPS, supra note 16, art. 27, ¶ 3(b); PAVONI, BIODIVERSITÀ E BIOTECNOLOGIE,
supra note 63, at 110.
72. Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body, 21 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 605, 620 (2010)
73. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
art. 3, ¶ 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
74. VCLT, supra note 59, arts. 31–32.
75. Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, at 16–17 (Apr. 29, 1996).
76. VCLT, supra note 59, art. 31, ¶ 1; Van Damme, supra note 72, at 631.
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tribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare.”77
Moreover, pursuant to Article 31.2 of the VCLT,78 TRIPS shall be interpreted in the context79 of the preambulary statements of the Agreement establishing the WTO, “allowing for the optimal use of the world’s
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development,
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the
means for doing so in a manner consistent with . . . needs and concerns at
different levels of economic development.”80
Finally, as clarified by the Appellate Body, the WTO Agreements shall
not be interpreted in “clinical isolation.”81 On the contrary, they should
be read through the lens of subsequent practice,82 and of “any relevant
77. TRIPS, supra note 16, art. 7.
78. VCLT, supra note 59, art. 31, ¶ 2.
79. See generally MARK VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 415, 427–29 (2009) [hereinafter VILLIGER, VIENNA
CONVENTION COMMENTARY]; see also, Mark E. Villiger, The 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties – 40 Years After, in 344 RECUEIL DES COURS. COLLECTED COURSES OF
THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 113–34 (2009) (Neth.).
80. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
81. The expression was used by the Appellate Body in the case United States –
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, supra note 75, ¶ 14. On the
relationship between WTO agreements and international law, see Gabrielle Marceau,
Fragmentation in International Law: The Relationship between WTO Law and General
International Law - A Few Comments from a WTO Perspective, 17 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L.
5 (2006); Gabrielle Marceau, Conflict of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdiction: The Relationship between the WTO Agreement and MEAs and Other Treaties, 35 J. WORLD
TRADE 1081 (2001); Gabrielle Marceau & Anastosios Tomazos, Comments on Joost
Pauwelyn’s Paper: ‘How to Win a WTO Dispute Based on Non-WTO Law?’, in 8 AT
THE CROSSROADS: THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AND THE DOHA ROUND 54, 56 (Stefan
Griller ed., 2008); JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 25, 35 (2003);
Joost Pauwelyn, The Application of Non-WTO Rules of International Law in WTO Dispute Settlement, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS 1405 (Patrick F. J. Macrory ed., 2005); see also Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty
Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body, supra note 72; Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note
26, paras. 165, 345; Isabelle Van Damme, Some Observations about the ILC Study Group
Report on the Fragmentation of International Law: WTO Treaty Interpretation against
the Background of Other International Law, 17 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 21 (2006).
82. VCLT, supra note 59, art. 31, ¶ 3(b); Georg Nolte, Subsequent Practice as a
Means of Interpretation in the Jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body, in THE LAW OF
TREATIES BEYOND THE VIENNA CONVENTION 138, 140–41 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2011);
VILLIGER, VIENNA CONVENTION COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 431.
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rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”83 Applying Article 31.3(c) of the VCLT to the WTO Agreements
may require consideration of other international law provisions, either
customary or conventional, which are both binding on the parties and
simultaneously applicable to the issue at stake.84 When dealing with the
grant of patents on inventions from MGRs, relevant provisions of international law can be found in UNCLOS and CDB, which, as noted before,
contribute to framing the MGRs’ legal regime and provide for their legal
status and management. Therefore, when applying TRIPS in this field
and interpreting its rules, UNCLOS and CBD provisions could be considered rules of international law relevant to the grant of patents on inventions derived from them. In light of the analysis undertaken on interpreting TRIPS, a discussion of its relationships to UNCLOS and the
CBD can now follow.
2. The Compatibility of IPRs and MGRs
To some extent, the standards provided by TRIPS, and even the attribution of exclusive rights to private individuals through the grant of patents, may be considered incompatible with some provisions set out by
UNCLOS. Indeed, as underscored by the Secretary General report on
Oceans and Law of the Sea:
[t]he following questions may arise and require further consideration:
whether filing a patent application is considered as a claim to part of
83. VCLT, supra note 59, art. 31, ¶ 3(c); VILLIGER, VIENNA CONVENTION
COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 432.
84. The notion of “parties” as provided by art. 31, ¶ 3(c) of the VCLT, is controversial. See Ulf Linderfalk, Who Are ‘The Parties’? Article 31, Paragraph 3(c) of the 1969
Vienna Convention and the ‘Principle of Systemic Integration’ Revisited, 55 NETH. INT’L
L. REV. 343, 347 (2008). On the application of the systemic interpretation criterion by the
WTO dispute settlement bodies, “it makes sense to interpret art. 31.3(c) as requiring consideration of those rules of international law which are applicable in the relations between
all parties to the treaty which is being interpreted.” See Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, ¶ 7.70,
WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006); see also Margaret Young,
The WTO’s Use of Relevant Rules of International Law: An Analysis of the Biotech Case,
56 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 907, 914–15 (2007); Benn McGrady, Fragmentation of International Law or “Systemic Integration” of Treaty Regimes: EC-Biotech Products and the
Proper Interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 42 J. WORLD TRADE 589, 614 (2008); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Dispute
over Genetically Modified Organisms: Interface Problems of International Trade Law,
Environmental Law and Biotechnology Law, in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 63, at 173; Andrew Thomison, A New Controversial Mandate for the
SPS Agreement: The WTO Panel’s Interim Report in the E.C. – Biotech Dispute, 32
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 287, 307 (2007).
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the marine environment or its resources; whether the rights conferred
by a patent are likely to interfere with the right to carry out marine scientific research; and whether the degree of confidentiality required prior to the filing for patents in order to safeguard the novel character of
an invention is compatible with the requirement for dissemination and
publication of data and research results.85

Firstly, according to some of the essential principles on which it is
based, the Area is a commons.86 As such, it is not subject to appropriation by individual states or persons, natural, or juridical.87 Activities in
the Area must be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole and
proceeds must be equitably shared among all parties.88 As demonstrated
above, even if MGRs are not directly encompassed in the common heritage regime regulated by Part XI of UNCLOS, they constitute common
concerns submitted to common use. Therefore, granting patents or inventions obtained from MGRs could be considered as incompatible with the
nature of commons—it would provide the holder an exclusive right to
use and commercially exploit the invention and, to some extent, also the
natural resources on which it is based, without requiring that activities on
MGRs are carried out for the benefit of mankind or that economic benefits arising from them are equitably shared among all states.89
Secondly, Article 241 of UNCLOS addresses the “non-recognition of
marine scientific research activities as the legal basis for claims.”90 This
article implies that scientific research and bioprospection on MGRs shall
not constitute the legal basis for claims either of ownership or of exclusive use of the resources. To correctly understand the meaning of Article
241, consideration should be given to the preparatory works. These reveal that the Article was adopted to preclude research being used as the
basis for claims of “exploitation rights or any other rights in areas beyond national jurisdiction.”91 As underlined by some, the grant of patents
on inventions derived from MGRs, as far as they attribute to their holder
the exclusive rights to use and commercially exploit the covered inven-

85. U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Rep. of the Secretary
General—Addendum, ¶ 241, U.N. Doc. A/62/66/Add.2 (Sept. 10, 2007).
86. See supra p. 192–98.
87. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 137. Vladimir-Djuro Degan, The Common Heritage
of Mankind in the Present Law of the Sea, in I LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA,
1363, 1375 (Nisuke Ando et al. eds., 2002).
88. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 140.
89. Kirchner, supra note 10, at 126–27.
90. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 241; de La Fayette, supra note 10, at 271.
91. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY
464 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. ed., 1991).
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tions, could be considered contrary to Article 241.92 Indeed, patents imply a concurrent restriction of third parties’ rights to use and exploit
MGRs located beyond national jurisdiction, which is exactly the effect
that Article 241 attempts to prevent.93
Finally, according to Article 244 of UNCLOS, states shall publicize
and disseminate research results, knowledge, scientific data, and information.94 The same is required of scientific research undertaken in the
Area, articulated in Article 143, which states that scientific results, when
available, shall be duly disseminated to state parties.95 Pursuant to Article
246.3, marine scientific research shall be carried out “in order to increase
scientific knowledge of the marine environment for the benefit of all
mankind.”96 Moreover, according to these provisions, the dissemination
of scientific results and knowledge shall favor developing countries,
which shall be given the chance to increase their autonomous scientific
and professional skill.97 In light of these objectives, the grant of patents
on marine scientific research results could be seen, at least in the short
term, as contrary to UNCLOS,98 unless the description of the invention,
disclosing the coverage and best mode for carrying out the invention, can
be considered as fulfilling UNCLOS provisions and guaranteeing the
compliance of IPRs with UNCLOS requirements.
C. Protecting Biological Diversity beyond National Jurisdiction
1. The CBD Legal Framework
The CBD was concluded in Rio de Janeiro on June 5, 1992, and entered into force on December 29, 1993.99 It has currently been ratified by
193 states. The CBD’s objectives consist of “the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by ap-

92. Charlotte Salpin & Valentina Germani, Patenting of Research Results Related to
Genetic Resources from Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: The Crossroad of the Law
of the Sea and Intellectual Property Law, 16 REV. EUR. CMTY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 12, 20–
22 (2007).
93. de La Fayette, supra note 10, at 271.
94. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 244; de La Fayette, supra note 10, at 271.
95. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 143, ¶ 3(c)
96. Id. art. 246, ¶ 3.
97. Id. art. 244, art. 143, ¶ 3(b).
98. de La Fayette, supra note 10, at 278.
99. CBD, supra note 15.
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propriate transfer of relevant technologies.”100 Pursuant to the CBD,
states have the sovereign right to exploit their own natural resources101
and the authority to regulate foreign states public institutions, and private
institutions’ access to them.102
Two mandatory principles govern access to these genetic resources.
First, the access to genetic resources is subject to the prior and informed
consent of the national authority of the state on the territory or jurisdiction the jurisdiction of which the resource is located.103 Second, the terms
that authorize access are agreed upon between the provider state and the
user.104 The content of the terms comprising the second principle is left
to the discretion of the parties. Nonetheless, the terms should ensure that
benefits arising from the economic exploitation of the resources are fairly
and equitably shared between the user and the provider state.105 Due to
the vagueness of the notion of “fair and equitable sharing of benefits,”
which the CBD does not define precisely, and considering that neither a
model contract nor standard clauses are provided by the convention, such

100. Id. art. 1. On the application of the CBD’s principles to genetic resources, see
Michael I. Jeffery, Bioprospecting: Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing
under the Convention on Biodiversity and the Bonn Guidelines, 6 SING. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 747, 749 (2002); Charles Lawson, Biodiversity Conservation Access and BenefitSharing Contracts and the Role and Place of Patents, 33 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 135,
137 (2011). See also WILLIAM LESSER, SUSTAINABLE USE OF GENETIC RESOURCES UNDER
THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: EXPLORING ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING
ISSUES (1998); McManis, supra note 63; Jean-Frédéric Morin, Les accords de bioprospection favorisent-ils la conservation des ressources génétiques? [Do Bioprospecting
Agreements Favor the Conservation of Genetic Resources?], 34 REVUE DE DROIT DE
L’UNIVERSITÉ DE SHERBROOKE 307 (2003) (Can.); PAVONI, BIODIVERSITÀ E
BIOTECNOLOGIE, supra note 63, at 119; PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN BOYLE & CATHERINE
REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 612 (3d ed. 2009); see generally PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 435 (2d ed.
2003); Aphrodite Smagadi, Analysis of the Objectives of the Convention on Biological
Diversity: Their Interrelation and Implementation Guidance for Access and Benefit Sharing, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 243 (2006); Aphrodite Smagadi, The Impact of the Convention on Biological Diversity on the Utilization of Plant Genetic Resources and Benefit
Sharing, 6 Y.B. EUR. ENVTL. L. 119 (2006); Zakir Thomas, Common Heritage to Common Concern. Preserving a Heritage and Sharing Knowledge, 8 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP.
248 (2005).
101. CBD, supra note 15, art. 3.
102. Id. art. 15.
103. Id. art. 15, ¶ 5.
104. Id. art. 15, ¶ 4.
105. Id. art. 15, ¶ 7.
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an objective cannot be easily reached. Indeed, practice demonstrates that
the corresponding obligation is seldom fulfilled.106
Given the practical difficulties faced by states and private operators
with regard to sharing, in 2002 the Conference of the Parties to the CBD
adopted the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair
and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization (the
“Bonn Guidelines”).107 This nonbinding instrument aims at facilitating
access to genetic resources and ensuring that benefits of any commercialization are duly shared with provider states.108 The Bonn Guidelines clarify the means through which the prior and informed consent and the fair
and equitable benefit sharing should be applied by national governments
and suggest a legal formula according to which they should be concretely
fulfilled.
Additionally, the CBD framework was recently expanded with the
adoption of the Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization (“Nagoya Protocol”).109 After lengthy negotiations,110 the Protocol was adopt-

106. Nerina Boschiero, Le biotecnologie tra etica e principi generali del diritto internazionale [Biotechnologies between Ethics and General Principles of International Law],
in BIOETICA E BIOTECNOLOGIE NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE E COMUNITARIO, supra note
63, at 70–71; Jonathan Carr, Agreements That Divide: TRIPs vs. CBD and Proposals for
Mandatory Disclosure of Source and Origin of Genetic Resources in Patent Applications,
18 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 131, 134 (2008); James S. Miller, Impact of the Convention
on Biological Diversity: The Lessons of Ten Years of Experience with Models for Equitable Sharing of Benefits, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
BIOTECHNOLOGY & TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 63, at 58, 65–66; Morin, supra
note 100, at 307.
107. Sixth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, The Hague, Neth., Apr. 7–9, 2002, Decision VI/24/A: Annex: Bonn Guidelines
on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising
out of their Utilization, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 [hereinafter Bonn Guidelines],
available at http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=7198; see generally W. Bradnee Chambers, Emerging International Rules on the Commercialization of Genetic Resources: The
FAO International Plant Genetic Treaty and the CBD Bonn Guidelines, 6 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 311 (2003); Jeffery supra note 100, at 747; Stephan Tully, The Bonn
Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing, 12 REV. EUR. CMTY &
INT’L ENVTL. L. 84, 84 (2003).
108. Chambers, supra note 107, at 314; Jeffery, supra note 100, at 747; Tully, supra
note 107, at 84.
109. Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Nagoya, Jap., Oct. 29, 2010, Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources
and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 [hereinafter Nagoya Protocol], available at http://www.cbd.int/abs/text/.
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ed on October 29, 2010, by the Conference of the parties of the CBD. It
will remain open for signature until February 1, 2012, and it will enter
into force after the fiftieth instrument of ratification is deposited.111
2. Do MGRs Fall Under the CBD?
Some maintain that the CBD cannot directly apply to MGRs, neither in
the water column nor in the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction,
because of the CBD’s limited territorial scope112 and the bilateral nature
of the exploitation scheme.113 To the contrary, MGRs can fall within the
reach of the CBD. However, given that the drafters of UNCLOS kept in
mind the possibility of future normative developments,114 the CBD must
firstly be interpreted consistently with UNCLOS when it comes to marine biodiversity before any application to MGRs can be made.
UNCLOS provides an important set of rules for the protection of the
marine environment in Part XII.115 These provisions do not apply exclusively in the sense that Part XII is a sort of “umbrella” agreement for the
protection of marine environment.116 This role of UNCLOS Part XII is
performed by the integration mechanism set out in Article 237, which
provides:

110. Negotiations were conducted by the Ad Hoc Open Ended Working Group on
Access and Benefit-Sharing of the CBD (“ABS Working Group”). Background,
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.cbd.int/abs/background (last visited
Oct. 1, 2011). The ABS Working Group was originally given in 2004 the task of drafting
a new legal instrument, called the International Regime on Access to Genetic Resources
and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising from Their Use. Id. The negotiations for such an instrument lead to the drafting of the Protocol. Id. For information
concerning activities carried out by the ABS Working Group, see CONVENTION ON
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.cbd.int/abs/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
111. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 109, arts. 26–27.
112. CBD, supra note 15, art. 4.
113. Nele Matz-Lück, The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind: Its Viability
as a Management Tool for Deep-Sea Genetic Resources, in THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
REGIME, supra note 43, at 63.
114. Article 237 in fact requires that subsequent instruments be uniformly applied with
UNCLOS. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 237.
115. Id. arts. 192–237.
116. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY,
supra note 91, at 423. See also Tullio Treves, Réflexions sur quelques conséquences de
l’entrée en vigueur de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer [Reflections
on a Number of Consequences of the Entry into Force of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea], 1994 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 849, 853–54
(Fr.), in which the author affirms: “Cet article [l’art. 237] vise à permettre à la Partie XII
de la Convention de mieux fonctionner comme convention-cadre vis-à-vis des autres
conventions qui portent sur la protection de l’environnement.”
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1. The provisions of this Part are without prejudice to the specific obligations assumed by States under special conventions and agreements
concluded previously which relate to the protection and preservation of
the marine environment and to agreements which may be concluded in
furtherance of the general principles set forth in this Convention.
2. Specific obligations assumed by States under special conventions,
with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment, should be carried out in a manner consistent with the general
principles and objectives of this Convention.117

This provision highlights how UNCLOS has an interdependent relationship with the existing instruments in the field of marine environment.118 This must be kept in mind when turning to the relevant provisions of the CBD, namely Article 4, which provides:
Subject to the rights of other States, and except as otherwise expressly
provided in this Convention, the provisions of this Convention apply, in
relation to each Contracting Party:
(a) In the case of components of biological diversity, in areas
within the limits of its national jurisdiction; and
(b) In the case of processes and activities, regardless of where
their effects occur, carried out under its jurisdiction or control,
within the area of its national jurisdiction or beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction.119

Some believe that Article 4(b) of the CBD precludes direct application
to MGRs in the water column of the high seas or on the deep seabed,120
while others authors suggest that “the State parties may only regulate the
activities of their own nationals to achieve the objectives of the CBD. So
far no state has implemented measures specifically regulating activities
of their nationals.”121 The latter view is contestable in the light of existing regulations, both national and international, concerning activities carried out on the high seas. For example, the freedom of high seas, a rule
beloved by states and approaching dogma, does not mean that states can
117. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 237 (emphasis added).
118. Seline Trevisanut, La Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer et le
droit de l’environnement: développement intrasystémique et renvoi intersystémique [The
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Environnemental Law: Intrasystemic Development and Intersystemic Cross-Reference], in LA CIRCULATION DES
CONCEPTS JURIDIQUES, supra note 23, at 415 (Fr.).
119. CBD, supra note 15, art. 4 (emphasis added).
120. Matz-Lück, supra note 113, at 63.
121. LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LAW & DEEP SEA GENETIC RESOURCES, supra note 39, at
52.
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do anything they want. Rather, the freedom of high seas is well regulated
both by customary and treaty law.122 This freedom encompasses, inter
alia, the freedom of navigation, the freedom to construct artificial islands
and installations, and the freedom of scientific research,123 which “shall
be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States
in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard
for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area.”124
The fundamental condition for enjoying these freedoms is the nationality of vessels. States enjoy freedoms that their nationals can likewise enjoy.125 Thus any vessel exercising an activity in the high seas has to be
linked with a state, exhibited by the flying of the flag.126 Such vessels are
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state,127 which has to exercise “its jurisdiction and control” over it.128 Unfortunately, not all flag
states are willing to exercise effectively their control on vessels.129 Consequently the implementation of the above mentioned CBD principles is
hampered.
However, it may then be asked whether other states might act under
Article 4(b) CBD. Processes or activities concerning MGRs can presumably be carried out or funded by a private actor, a research institute, or a
pharmaceutical company, which controls the activity or process. Private
actors have a nationality in conformity with international law criteria.130
122. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 87, ¶ 1(f); CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 54, at
203.
123. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 87, ¶ 1(a), (d), (f).
124. Id. art. 87, ¶ 2.
125. Id. arts. 90–91; CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 54, at 166.
126. UNCLOS, supra note 14, arts. 91–92.
127. Id. art. 92, ¶ 1.
128. Id. art. 94.
129. See Dr. Ademuni-Odeke, An Examination of Bareboat Charter Registries and
Flag of Convenience Registries in International Law, 36 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 339, 341
(2005); JOHN N. K. MANSELL, FLAG STATE RESPONSIBILITY: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, AN ANALYSIS OF FLAG STATE RESPONSIBILITY FROM A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 140–41 (2009); Djamchid Momtaz, La Convention des Nations
Unies sur les conditions d’immatriculation des navires [The United Nations Convention
on Conditions for Registration of Ships], 1986 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 715 (Fr.); Tullio Treves, Flags of Convenience before the Law of the Sea
Tribunal, 6 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 179 (2004).
130. As far as the nationality of legal persons is concerned, the main international law
criteria were stated by the International Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction, Light
and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep 3 (Feb. 5).
Comments on this case can be found in Rosalyn Higgins, Aspects of the Case Concerning
the Barcelona Traction Company, 11 VA. J. INT’L L. 327 (1971); Richard B. Lillich, Two
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States are bound to exercise due diligence131 towards private actors and
activities carried out on their territory or under their jurisdiction.132 It is
debatable whether such an obligation exists with regard to private actors’
behavior outside the national state, i.e. if their activities abroad fall under
the national state’s jurisdiction.133 However, even if the existence of such
a general obligation is doubted, states must pay due diligence in specific
sectors. For instance, UNCLOS provides that states “shall keep under
surveillance the effects of any activities which they permit or in which
they engage in order to determine whether these activities are likely to
pollute the marine environment.”134 Reading Article 4(b) CBD in combination with this provision suggests that the state of nationality of private
actors or even the state sponsoring the private activity does have a role to
Perspectives on the Barcelona Traction Case, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 522 (1971); Francis A.
Mann, The Protection of Shareholders’ Interests in the Light of the Barcelona Traction
Case, 67 AM. J. INT’L L. 259 (1973); Brigitte Stern, La protection diplomatique des investissements internationaux. De Barcelona Traction à Elettronica Sicula ou les glissements
progressifs de l’analyse [The Diplomatic Protection of International Investments. From
the Barcelona Traction to Elettronica Sicula and the Progressive Shifts in Analysis], 117
JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 897 (1990) (Fr.). On the attribution of nationality to
legal persons, see also Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 61st Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–
Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/10, Supp. No. 10, at 13 (2006).
131. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment,
1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
132. RICCARDO PISILLO MAZZESCHI, “DUE DILIGENCE” E RESPONSABILITÀ
INTERNAZIONALE DEGLI STATI [“DUE DILIGENCE” AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
THE STATES], 234–36 (1989) (It.). On this issue see U.S. v. Iran, 1980 I.C.J. at 3; Luigi
Condorelli, L’imputation à l’Etat d’un fait internationalement illicite: solutions
classiques et nouvelles tendances [The Attribution of Internationally Wrongful Acts to
States: Classical Solutions and New Trends], 189 RECUEIL DES COURS. COLLECTED
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 19, 95 (1984) (Neth.).
133. The extraterritorial application of the due diligence obligation is an on-going and
everlasting debate in international law literature and international legal practice. The
analysis of such a topic goes far beyond the scope of the present contribution. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 308 (7th ed. 2008); A.
Vaughn Lowe, Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 341–42 (Malcolm D. Evands ed., 2d
ed. 2008); Francis A. Mann, The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited after
Twenty Years, 186 RECUEIL DES COURS. COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (1984) (Neth.); EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE (Karl Matthias Meessen ed., 1996); François Rigaux, Le concept de territorialité: un fantasme en quête de réalité [The Concept of Territoriality: A Fantasy in Search
of Reality], in LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI 211 (Emile Yapok &
Tahar Boumedra eds., 1999) (Fr.); Brigitte Stern, Quelques observations sur les règles
internationales relatives a l’application extraterritoriale du droit [Some Observations on
International Rules Concerning the Extraterritorial Application of Law], 32 ANNUAIRE
FRANCA
̧ IS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 7 (1986).
134. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 204 (emphasis added).
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play;135 the state, if is a party to the CBD, would be bound by it in regards to activities and processes concerning MGRs beyond national jurisdiction.
This interpretation would be in line with the recommendation of the
Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice of
the CBD (“SBSTTA”):136
(c) Concerned about the threats to genetic resources in the
deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, requests Parties and
urges other States, having identified activities and processes
under their jurisdiction and control which may have significant adverse impacts on deep seabed ecosystems and species
in these areas, as requested in paragraph 56 of decision VII/5,
to take measures to urgently manage such practices in vulner135. Under the regime set in Part XI, a state can sponsor the application of a private
actor carrying out activities of exploration and exploitation of the Area. UNCLOS, supra
note 14, art. 153. Considering the possible application of the Area regime concerning the
exploitation of MGRs, the sponsoring by a state system can be taken into consideration
for the MGRs regime. A potential sponsoring state could be encompassed in the scope of
application of Article 4(b) CBD. UNCLOS does not precisely define the degree of control exercised by the sponsoring state on the private actor and on the activities. The delegation of Nauru submitted such a proposal to the Council of the Authority, which then
submitted a request for advisory opinion to the Seabed Disputes Chamber of ITLOS.
Delegation of Nauru, Proposal presented to the Int’l Seabed Auth. Council, 16th Sess.,
Apr. 26–May 7, 2010, ISBA/16/C/6 (Mar. 5 2010); Responsibilities and Obligations of
States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, ¶ 78, Case
No. 17, Seabed Disputes Chamber Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011,
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/adv_op_010211.pdf,
stating that:
[a]s the Convention [UNCLOS] does not consider the links of nationality and
effective control sufficient to obtain the result that the contractor conforms with
the Convention and related instruments, it requires a specific act emanating
from the will of the State or States of nationality and of effective control. Such
act consists in the decision to sponsor.
From this voluntary act follows an obligation of due diligence for the sponsoring state
concerning the activities carried out by the sponsored private actors. Id. ¶ 116. Sponsorship might be considered as a confirmation of the existence of effective control and, consequently, confirm the application of Article 4(b) of the CBD.
136. Article 25 of the CBD establishes an open-ended intergovernmental scientific
advisory body known as the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological
Advice (“SBSTTA”) to provide the Conference of the Parties (“COP”) and its other subsidiary bodies, with timely advice relating to the implementation of the Convention.
CBD, supra note 15, art. 25. Its functions include providing assessments of the status of
biological diversity, providing assessments of the types of measures taken in accordance
with the provisions of the Convention, and responding to questions that the COP may put
to the body. Id.
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able deep seabed ecosystems with a view to the conservation
and sustainable use of resources, and report on measures taken
as part of the national reporting process.137

This statement was echoed by Decision VIII/21 of the eighth CBD
Conference of the parties, stressing the potential application of the CBD
to the issue at hand and the active role parties of the CBD are called to
play in the shaping of a regime for MGRs.138 Moreover, the recently
adopted Nagoya Protocol139 recognizes the need of finding an “innovative solution,” addressing “the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the utilization of genetic resources . . . for which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed consent.”140 This carefully worded
expression seems to target genetic resources, such as MGRs, that do not
fall under the jurisdiction of any state. This phrasing thus supports the
view that the CBD applies to MGRs in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
II. A LEGAL REGIME FOR MGRS: FEASIBLE SOLUTIONS
Despite the possibility that extra-territorial activities involving MGRs
may still be attributable to a specific state, it remains to be determined
who would be responsible for overseeing the administration of the legal
regime. Indeed, it is evident that a “national state” cannot be identified
when dealing with MGRs in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
Generally, from developed nations’ perspectives, intellectual property
is an essential incentive to invent and produce biotech products,141 the
usefulness of which cannot be denied. As far as the G77 countries are
concerned, the grant of patents for MGRs-based inventions gives rise to
economic benefits that need to be equitably shared among the patent
holder and the international community, with special consideration for
the needs of developing countries.142
137. Eleventh Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technological & Technological Advice [SBSTTA], Montreal, Can., Nov. 28–Dec. 2, 2005, Recommendation
XI/8: Marine and coastal biological diversity: conservation and sustainable use of deep
seabed genetic resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, ¶ 4(c) (2005), available at http://www.cbd.int/recommendation/sbstta/?id=10967.
138. Eighth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Curitiba, Braz., Mar. 20–31, 2006, Decision VIII/21: Marine and coastal biological diversity: conservation and sustainable use of deep seabed genetic resources
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, ¶ 3 (2006).
139. See supra note 109.
140. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 109, pmbl.
141. LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LAW & DEEP SEA GENETIC RESOURCES, supra note 39, at
175.
142. Id.
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Given the present unbalanced condition in the current legal regimes, it
has been correctly noted that “it is hard to see how the majority of the
international community will benefit from the monopoly protection provided to patent holders of biotechnology products derived from MGRs
taken from ocean areas beyond national jurisdiction.”143 Considering this
inequity in light of the undeniable contribution intellectual property protection provides to scientific and technological development, “states
should seriously discuss viable and realistic options for . . . sharing benefits in a fair and equitable way.”144
In this light, this section (A) examines the means through which the international obligations can be met when MGRs are concerned and (B)
identifies which would be the most appropriate authority as a counterparty of the users. Four legal solutions are identified in the first section (A):
(1) the application of the Bonn Guidelines; (2) the hopeful entry into
force of the Nagoya Protocol to the CBD; (3) the adoption of a disclosure
of origin clause to be inserted in TRIPS; and (4) the adoption of a legal
model inspired to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
(“FAO”) International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and

143. Robert J. McLaughlin, Exploiting Marine Genetic Resources beyond National
Jurisdiction and the International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: Can They
Coexist?, in LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE, supra note 13, at 379.
144. Third Meeting of the U.N. Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group to
Study Issues Relating to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction, New York, U.S., Feb. 1–5, 2010, EU Intervention on Agenda Item 5.g – Marine Genetic Resources, with a Particular Focus on
the Relevant Regime in accordance with the Convention, at 2 (on file with the authors)
[hereinafter U.N. Working Group, EU Intervention on Agenda Item 5.g]. According to
Tullio Scovazzi,
[w]hile a specific regime for the exploitation of genetic resources is lacking, the
aim of sharing the benefit among all States, which was the main aspect of the
seminal proposal made by Arvid Pardo, can still be seen as the paramount objective embodied in the LOS Convention for everything that takes place in the
Area. Also in the field of genetic resources, the application of the principle of
freedom of the sea (that is the ‘first-come-first-served’ rule) leads to inequitable
and hardly acceptable consequences. New cooperative schemes have to be envisaged at the international level, based on the objective of the benefit of all
States. This is also in full conformity with the principle of fair and equitable
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources set
forth by Article 1 of the CBD.
Scovazzi, Seabed beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, supra note 47, at 57. See
also Salvatore Arico, Marine Genetic Resources in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction
and Intellectual Property Rights, in LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE, supra note 13, at
385.
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Agriculture.145 Section (B) explores two institutional scenarios: (1) the
attribution of a primary role to the Authority and (2) the creation of a
new international institution.
A. Possible Legal Frameworks
1. MGRs and the Bonn Guidelines
The first solution to be explored considers the provisions of the Bonn
Guidelines in guaranteeing both the protection of intellectual property
and the fair and equitable benefit sharing for patented products based on
MGRs.
The Bonn Guidelines provide clarifications that facilitate the concrete
application of CBD and, in particular, the enforcement of both the prior
and informed consent and the fair and equitable benefit-sharing obligations.146 In order to pursue these objectives, the Bonn Guidelines establish that contracting parties shall set up National Focal Points, i.e., domestic authorities focused on the management of the access procedure to
genetic resources by foreign institutions, which also aim to enter into the
agreements addressed to define the terms of such an access.147 Pursuant
to the Guidelines, these terms should be agreed to on a case-by-case basis.148 Mechanisms for benefit sharing should vary depending upon the
type of benefits, the specificity of the resource at issue, the specific conditions in the country, and the stakeholders involved.149 The National
Focal Points should also develop framework agreements, as well as
standardize material transfer agreements and benefit-sharing arrangements.150 Pursuant to Paragraph 48, benefits should be fairly and equitably shared with all identifiable contributors to the resource management
and to its scientific and commercial exploitation151 The latter “may include governmental, nongovernmental or academic institutions, as well
as indigenous and local communities.”152 Moreover, “[b]enefits should
be directed in such a way as to promote conservation and sustainable use

145. International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Nov.
3, 2001, 2400 U.N.T.S. 303 [hereinafter ITPGRFA].
146. Chambers, supra note 107, at 316; Jeffery, supra note 100, at 747; Thomas, supra
note 100, at 250; Tully, supra note 107, at 84.
147. Bonn Guidelines, supra note 107, ¶ 13.
148. Id. ¶ 41.
149. Id. ¶ 42.
150. Id. ¶ 42(b)(iii)–(iv).
151. Id. ¶ 48.
152. Id.
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of biological diversity.”153 Likewise, pursuant to Paragraph 43(a), ethical
concerns of parties and stakeholders should be taken into consideration
in drafting the mutually agreed-on terms.154 Parties and stakeholders
should define the conditions, obligations, procedures, types, timing, distribution, and mechanisms upon which benefits should be shared.155 These will vary depending on what is regarded as fair and equitable in light
of the circumstances. Near-term, medium-term, and long-term benefits
should be considered and monetary and nonmonetary benefits may be
agreed upon.156 Some of the means suggested by the Bonn Guidelines are
suitable with MGRs and should be applied in order to guarantee the fair
and equitable sharing of the benefits accrued from their exploitation.
Among these means are the attribution of payments; the setting up of
joint ventures; the constitution of joint ownership on relevant IPRs; the
sharing of research and development results; the transfer of relevant
knowledge and technology; and the collaboration, cooperation and contribution in scientific research and development programs.157 Finally,
notable among Bonn’s suggested means is the payment of royalties, 158
which could be considered to be in line with the system provided for by
Article 82 of UNCLOS.
This latter provision sets in place a mechanism for an international
royalty to be levied for the exploitation of nonliving resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.159 Article 82 UNCLOS provides
that coastal states shall make payments or contributions in respect of
their exploitation and establishes the rate and the formula according to
which the amount shall be calculated.160 Moreover, it provides that pay153. Id.
154. Id. ¶ 43(a).
155. Id. ¶ 45.
156. Among the suggested examples listed in Appendix II for monetary benefits are
up-front payments, milestone payments, payment of royalties, license fees, special fees to
be paid to trust funds supporting conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, salaries
and preferential terms, research funding, joint ventures, and joint ownership of relevant
intellectual property rights. Id. app. II, ¶ 1. The list of nonmonetary benefits includes
sharing of research and development results, participation in product development, admittance to ex situ facilities of genetic resources and to databases, transfer of knowledge and
technology under fair and most favorable terms, access to scientific information relevant
to conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, contributions to the local
economy and to research directed towards priority needs, such as health and food security, as well as collaboration, cooperation and contribution in scientific research, development programs, education, and training. Id. app. II, ¶ 2.
157. Id. ¶¶ 43–50.
158. Id. app. II, ¶ 1(d).
159. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 82.
160. Id.
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ments shall be made through the Authority, which shall distribute them
to parties, on the basis of equitable sharing criteria and with special regard to the needs of developing states, least developed states, and landlocked countries.161
As to the application of such a mechanism, it has been noted that “this
revenue-sharing formula was developed with the unique characteristics
of offshore oil and gas production in mind, but there is no reason why an
appropriate formula could not also be found for revenues from commercialization of MGRs,” which at that time were not yet discovered.162 In
our view, the definition of formulas and rates according to which benefits
should be shared represents an interesting and useful compromise between intellectual property protection and equity needs claimed by developing countries. Unfortunately, when applied to MGRs, such a method ineluctably faces difficulties due to the lack of an authority competent
to manage their utilization, to authorize and discipline their exploitation
and, consequently, to receive the amount of money deriving from the
sharing of the economic benefits accrued. Should an institution gain such
competences in the future, this solution could be taken into consideration.
2. MGRs and the Nagoya Protocol
The possible approaches outlined in the Bonn Guidelines could be further strengthened by the Nagoya Protocol’s entry into force. The Protocol defines the modalities according to which the parties shall enforce the
principles of prior and informed consent and the fair and equitable benefit-sharing obligations, as set out in the CBD. The content of many of its
articles is either directly inspired or influenced by the Bonn Guidelines.
As far as MGRs are specifically concerned, after long debates, the negotiating parties agreed to introduce a provision—Article 10—dealing
expressly with sharing of benefits that arise from the utilization of genetic resources in transboundary situations or from uses for which it is not
possible to grant or obtain prior informed consent.163 Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that many parties opposed the inclusion of MGRs in the
application of the Protocol, it eventually applies also to their exploitation.164
161. Id. art. 82, ¶ 4.
162. McLaughlin, supra note 143, at 381.
163. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 109, art. 10.
164. Int’l Institute for Sustainable Dev., Summary of the Resumed Ninth Meeting of the
Working Group on Access and Benefit–Sharing of the Convention on Biological Diversity: 10-16 July 2010, in 9 IISD REPORTING SERIES 257, at 4–5 (July 19, 2010), available at
www.iisd.ca/biodiv/rabs9.
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The relationship between the Protocol and other international instruments is one of the most controversial points that arose during the negotiations.165 The parties agreed on the final draft of Article 4, which has a
complex structure that breaks into four paragraphs. The first paragraph is
directly inspired by the coordination clause provided in Article 22 of the
CBD and establishes that the present instrument “shall not affect the
rights and obligations of any party deriving from any existing international agreement, except where the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity.”166
Further paragraphs provide for the Nagoya Protocol’s implementation in
a “mutually supportive manner” with other relevant international instruments and, in particular, with those specialized on access and benefit
sharing.167 In this regard they follow the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety168—the first Protocol to the CBD—in demanding mutual support as a
tool of interpretation.169 However, the Nagoya Protocol differs by giving
the provision on mutual support a broader ambit and an expressly binding character, as it is not limited to a general and preambulary statement.
Moreover, according to Paragraph 3, “useful and relevant ongoing work
or practices under international instruments and relevant organizations”
deserve due regard in implementing the Protocol.170 The only situation in
which the Nagoya Protocol is explicitly subjected to the application of
other international instruments is set forth in Paragraph 4; namely, the
Protocol shall not apply to states which are at the same time parties to
another international instrument providing for the access and benefitsharing regime of a specific genetic resource, when this latter instrument
is consistent with the letter and purpose of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol.171 Therefore, the formulation of Article 4 gives the parties discretion as to how they wish to deal with the management of MGRs, either
through the application of already existing and consistent legal instru-

165. Id.
166. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 109, art. 4, ¶ 1.
167. Id. ¶¶ 2–3.
168. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan.
29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208 [hereinafter Cartagena Protocol].
169. On this topic, see Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Makane Moïse Mbengue, A
propos du principe du soutien mutual: Les relations entre le Protocole de Cartagena et
les accords de l’OMC [The Principle of Mutual Support: The Relation between the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO Agreements], 111 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 829 (2007) (Fr.).
170. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 109, art. 4, ¶ 3.
171. Id. art. 4, ¶ 4.
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ments, or by way of the future adoption of a specific and consistent
one.172
The Nagoya Protocol goes further than the Bonn Guidelines in establishing the issuance of internationally recognized certificates by the
competent national authorities.173 It also provides for their notification to
the Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing House, a mechanism established by the Protocol as part of the Clearing House mechanism set out in
Article 18.3 CBD.174 Such certificates shall show that the genetic resource has been obtained, accessed, and used in accordance with prior
informed consent, and that mutually agreed-upon terms have been entered into.175 The certificates shall contain minimum information, such as
the identities of the issuing national authority, the provider, and the user.
Moreover, they shall specify the subject matter covered and the geographic location of the access activity, the uses permitted and the correspondent restrictions, as well as the conditions of transfer to third parties.176 Lastly, the certificates shall contain a link to the mutually agreedon terms regulating the benefit sharing.177
The Protocol provides that parties shall establish clear rules and procedures for mutually agreed-on terms.178 Such terms, to be set out in writing, may include a dispute settlement clause and terms on monetary and
nonmonetary benefit sharing, as well as on subsequent third-party use.
Monetary and nonmonetary benefits are listed in the Annex and are directly inspired by the Bonn Guidelines.179 Accordingly, parties shall encourage the development, update, and use of model contractual clauses
for mutually agreed-upon terms, as well as the draft of codes of conduct
and best practice standards in relation to access and benefit sharing, in
consultation with users and providers from key sectors.180 The Protocol
likewise provides that parties shall take measures to monitor the utilization of genetic resources, for instance, by establishing checkpoints and
disclosure requirements.181
The Nagoya Protocol addresses the specific cases in which access and
benefit sharing of genetic resources occur in transboundary situations or

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. art. 4, ¶¶ 1, 2, 4.
Id. art. 6, ¶ 3(e), art. 13, ¶ 2, art. 17, ¶¶ 2–4.
Id. art. 6, ¶ 3(e), art. 14, ¶ 2(c).
Id.
Id. art. 17, ¶ 4.
Id.
Id. art. 5, art. 6, ¶ 3(g), art. 18.
Id. annex.
Nagoya Protocol, supra note 109, arts. 19–20.
Id. art. 17.
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in situations in which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed
consent. This is done through the Protocol’s provision that establishes a
Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism.182 The parties agree to
further develop its functional modalities according to their needs.183 Additionally, with regard to benefits, the Protocol states that benefits arising
from the utilization of resources shall be used to support the conservation
of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components globally.184
Thus the Nagoya Protocol appears to represent a workable solution for
the management of MGRs. Indeed, the Protocol pursues the same legal
objectives as the Bonn Guidelines—the fulfillment of the prior and informed consent and of the fair and equitable benefit-sharing obligations—but may prove to be more effective. The Protocol is binding and
provides for some solutions that are particularly suitable for MGRs, such
as the creation of a Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism and
the issuance of internationally recognized certificates.185 Should the former be effectively implemented, it could guarantee the conservation of
biological diversity and the equitable sharing of benefits, while overcoming some of the specific difficulties of MGRs’ management. Finally,
should a specific international body ultimately enjoy the competence to
authorize access to and commercial exploitation of MGRs, the issuance
of international recognized certificates would certainly contribute to
guaranteeing their correct administration and to avoiding abuses.
3. MGRs and the Possibility of a “Disclosure of Origin” Clause
According to the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the TRIPS Council is
called upon to “examine, inter alia, the relationship between the TRIPS
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity,” as well as to
review TRIPS relevant provisions.186 Negotiations are still underway
since the topic gives rise to strong debates between developed and developing countries.187 Up to now, the main outcome of such negotiations is a
182. Id. art. 10.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Doha Declaration, supra note 20, ¶ 19.
187. The positions endorsed by the Member states, as well as the relevant documents
filed, are available at the WTO website, www.wto.org. A summary of these positions is
also provided by the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Note by the Secretariat: The Relationship between the TRIPs Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, IP/C/W/368/Rev.1 (Feb. 8, 2006) (hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement
&
Biological
Diversity
Convention],
available
at

2011]

TRIPS ON THE HIGH SEAS

221

proposition to insert a “disclosure of origin clause” within TRIPS. Such a
provision should have the effect of ensuring the respect of the CBD’s
obligations at the moment of filing a patent application on inventions
based on genetic resources detained by provider countries.188 However,
as we will see below, negotiations are still ongoing and show a certain
unpredictability with regard to the formulation and the actual insertion of
the clause.189
Starting with the beginning of the Doha Round in 2001 up to the 2011
consultations, some member states, such as the United States and Japan,
have maintained that no conflict exists between CBD and TRIPS, implying that the contractual approach provided in the CBD is a means to its
own end.190 Others, in particular developing countries, pushed in favor of
amending TRIPS, in order to insert a disclosure of origin clause.191 As
we will see, some other WTO member countries have since significantly
modified their positions.192 Among them, the European Union, who originally claimed that the topics should be dealt with outside the ambit of
patent law (i.e. in civil or administrative law),193 and Switzerland, who
supported the insertion of a disclosure of origin clause in the Patent Cooperation Treaty,194 out of the WTO forum.195
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ipcw368_e.pdf. On the negotiation see
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Minutes of the Meeting, 8–9 June 2010, IP/C/M/63 (Oct. 4, 2010); General Council Trade Negotiations
Comm., Report on the Issues related to the Extension of the Protection of Geographical
Indications Provided for in Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement to Products other than
Wines and Spirits and those related to the Relationship between the TRIPs Agreement
and the Convention on Biological Diversity, WT/GC/W/633 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter
Report on the Extension of the Protection of Geographical Indications].
188. On the insertion of a disclosure of origin clause, see BONADIO, supra note 63;
Graham Dutfield, Sharing the Benefits of Biodiversity: Is there a Role for the Patent System?, in THE WTO, TRADE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 511 (Gary Sampson & John Whalley
eds., 2005); Martin A. Girsberger, Transparency Measures under Patent Law regarding
Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge: Disclosure of Source and Evidence of
Prior Informed Consent and Benefit-Sharing, 7 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 451 (2004);
Michael I. Jeffery, Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity Conservation: Reconciling the Incompatibilities of the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES, supra note 63, at 186–
87. See generally Jacques de Werra, Fighting against Biopiracy: Does the Obligation to
Disclose in Patent Applications Truly Help?, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 143, 146–50
(2009).
189. See supra note 187.
190. See TRIPs Agreement & Biological Diversity Convention, supra note 187.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7654, 1160 U.N.T.S. 1979.
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After long debates, in July 2008, a group of fifty-two member states,
composed mostly of developing countries, such as the African, Carribean
and Pacific Group (“ACP Group”), India, Brazil, Peru, as well as China,
South Africa, and the African Group, joined together with Switzerland
and the European Union to agree on a common “Draft Modalities Text”
(“DMT”).196 The sponsoring states proposed to amend TRIPS through
the insertion in the text of a mandatory disclosure of origin requirement.197 According to the DMT, in order to comply with the latter requirement, either the provider country or the source of the genetic resources shall be disclosed in patent applications.198
The insertion of the fourth mandatory requirement for patentability
(additional to novelty, inventive step, and industrial application) into
TRIPS would guarantee that patents would be released only for inventions complying with the principles set by the CBD. Therefore, DMT
would represent a very desirable compromise between developing countries and some developed states,199 and it would avoid burdensome opposition and revocation procedures being eventually perceived as the only
means for obtaining, even if ex post, that patents comply with the essential requirements and the fundamental values guaranteed under the ordre
public exception.200
However, due to the vagueness of DMT, the following consultations
“have not created convergence [but] have certainly shed light on the divergences.”201 Member states have been debating four main points concerning not only the legal character of misappropriation, administrative
costs, and burdens connected with the introduction of the disclosure of
origin clause, but also the adequacy of alternative measures. Additional195. See TRIPs Agreement & Biological Diversity Convention, supra note 187.
196. Trade Negotiations Comm., Draft Modalities for TRIPs Related Issues,
TN/C/W/52 (July 19, 2008) [hereinafter DMT].
197. Id. According to paragraph 4 of the DMT: “Members agree to amend the TRIPS
Agreement to include a mandatory requirement for the disclosure of the country providing/source of genetic resources, and/or associated traditional knowledge for which a definition will be agreed upon, in patent applications. Patent applications will not be processed without completion of the disclosure requirement.”
198. Id.
199. It is worth noting that, notwithstanding the wide participation to DMT, the compromise is not supported by the United States and Japan.
200. See Bonfanti, supra note 69; Gold, supra note 69, at 15; MILLS, supra note 69;
M.B. RAO & MANJULA GURU, BIOTECHNOLOGY, IPRS AND BIODIVERSITY 211–14 (2007);
LI WESTERLUND, BIOTECH PATENTS: EQUIVALENCE AND EXCLUSIONS UNDER EUROPEAN
AND U.S. PATENT LAW (2002).
201. Pascal Lamy, Dir.–Gen., Trade Negotiations Comm., Opening Statement at
Committee
Meeting
(Mar.
22,
2010),
available
at
www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/tnc_dg_stat_22mar10_e.htm.
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ly, debates include the legal character and enforcement possibilities of a
national based approach.202 Each of the debated points is crucial for patents on MGRs. Indeed, a provision with a narrow definition of “misappropriation” (e.g., taking into account only illegal or illegitimate acts on
those genetic resources which are located under the national jurisdiction
of states) would clearly render the disclosure of origin clause unsuitable
for MGRs. Moreover, the additional administrative costs deriving from
incorporating the mandatory disclosure requirement might be excessively
detrimental for investment and research development. This would clearly
discourage states from insisting on its insertion as a requirement for patentability. Finally, should alternative solutions (such as national-based
mechanisms or contract-based measures) be considered as more effective
and less costly, the possibility of inserting a disclosure of origin clause
would probably be put aside.
The debate has not yet been settled and the situation has not yet concretely evolved after the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol.203 The Doha
Round is still open and new consultations have begun. Even if the outcome can hardly be predicted, it is uncertain that a definite, precise, and
adequate compromise on a disclosure of origin clause can be reached,
one that would be capable of guaranteeing the enforcement of the prior
and informed consent as well as the fair and equitable sharing of benefits. However, in the unlikely event that such an outcome is reached, it
could be very useful for the management of MGRs. Indeed, it would ensure the enforcement of the CBD’s obligations when patent applications
on MGRs are filed by requiring mutually agreed-on terms on access and
fair and equitable benefit-sharing. Nonetheless, it appears clear that in
order for a disclosure of origin clause to be implemented and function
properly, a centralized institution on the international level would have to
be implemented and have the ability to enforce the patentability requirements.
4. MGRs and the FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture Model
The last workable model for MGRs’ management to examine is the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture

202. See Report on the Extension of the Protection of Geographical Indications, supra
note 187.
203. Nagoya Gives New Context to Old Views in Intellectual Property Council,
TRADE
ORG.
(Mar.
1,
2011),
WORLD
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/trip_01mar11_e.htm.
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(“ITPGRFA”).204 It pursues the same objectives as the CBD, even if its
field of application ratione materiae is narrower, i.e. only plant genetic
resources for food and agriculture.205
The treaty establishes the Multilateral System, set forth in Article
10,206 which aims at facilitating access to genetic resources and providing
for the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from their use.207
Pursuant to Article 12, genetic materials can be accessed by legal and
natural persons only through the Multilateral System. Access is provided
for the purpose of utilization and conservation for research, breeding, and
training for food and agriculture, so long as the use does not include
chemical, pharmaceutical, and/or other nonfood/feed industrial uses.208
Recipients cannot claim any intellectual property or other rights that limit

204. ITPGRFA, supra note 145. The ITPGRFA contracting parties number 123; neither Japan nor the United States have ratified it, even though the United States is a signatory as of 2002. Id. For more information on the ITPGRFA, see Chambers, supra note
107; see also Carlos M. Correa, The Access Regime and the Implementation of the FAO
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture in the Andean
Group Countries, 6 WORLD INTELL. PROP. 795 (2003); Luigi Crema, Draft Procedures
and Operational Mechanisms to Promote Compliance and to Address Issues of NonCompliance under the 2001 International Treaty on Plant and Genetic Resources for
Food and Agriculture, in NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES AND MECHANISMS AND THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 137, 137–52 (Tullio
Treves et al. eds., 2009); Christine Frison, Tom Dedeurwaerdere & Michael Halewood,
Intellectual Property and Facilitated Access to Genetic Resources under the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 1 (2010); Christiane Gerstetter et al., The International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture within the Current Legal Regime Complex on Plant
Genetic Resources, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 259 (2007); Muriel Lightbourne, The
FAO Multilateral System for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: Better
than Bilateralism?, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 465, 467–71 (2009); Riccardo Pavoni,
Accesso alle risorse fitogenetiche e diritti di proprietà intellettuale dopo il trattato della
FAO del 2001 [Access to Plant Genetic Resources and Intellectual Property Rights after
the FAO Treaty in 2001], 58 LA COMUNITÀ INTERNAZIONALE 369 (2003) (It.).
205. ITPGRFA, supra note 145, art. 1, ¶ 1.
206. Id. art. 10.
207. Id. art. 10, ¶ 2. The ITPGRFA covers the resources listed in Annex I, which are
under the control of the contracting parties and in the public domain, as well as those
genetic resources held in the ex situ collections of the International Agricultural Research
Centers of the Consultative Group of the International Agricultural Research. See id.
annex I. The Multilateral System can also apply, on a voluntary basis, to plant genetic
resources for food and agriculture held by natural and legal persons within the jurisdiction of the contracting parties, and to those held by international institutions, other than
the Centers, with which the Governing Body for the International Treaty will have concluded agreements for the purposes of the Treaty. See id.
208. Id. art. 12, ¶ 3(a).
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access to the resources from the Multilateral System, or their genetic
parts or components.209
Pursuant to Article 12.4, access to genetic resources and benefit sharing shall be governed by agreements entered into by the interested legal
or natural persons, acting as providers and recipients, in accordance with
the Standard Material Transfer Agreement (“SMTA”).210 The content of
the SMTA complies with the ITPGRFA’s relevant provisions. Indeed, it
states that the provider shall accord access to genetic resources expeditiously. On the other hand, the recipient shall undertake that the resources accessed be used or conserved only for the purposes allowed by
ITPGRFA. SMTA also states that, if the recipient commercializes a
product incorporating genetic resources covered by the Multilateral System, he/she shall pay a fixed percentage of the sales into the mechanism
established by the Governing Body for this purpose (the Trust Fund, or
Trust Account),211 or according to alternative payment schemes defined
within the SMTA.212 Articles 13 of ITPGRFA and 6.9 of SMTA set forth
additional terms, including but not limited to, such requirements that the
recipient: make all nonconfidential information that results from research
and development carried out on the resources supplied available to the
Multilateral System; share nonmonetary benefits that result from such
research and development; and facilitate access to technologies for conservation and use of genetic resources.213
209. Id. art. 12, ¶ 3(d). According to Chambers:
This question was one of the main sticking points between the United States
and developing countries in the Plant Genetic Treaty negotiations. The United
States did not want to preclude the possibility of its companies isolating a
gene—such as a reagent, a cell line or DNA sequencing—or a microbe from
genetic material and patenting it.
Chambers, supra note 107, at 319.
210. Id. art. 12, ¶ 4. Such an agreement was adopted by the Governing Body, with
Resolution 1/2006 of 16 June 2006. Governing Body of the Int’l Treaty on Plant Genetic
Res. for Food & Agric., Res.1/2006, U.N. Doc. IT/GB-1/06/Report App. G (2006) [hereinafter
SMTA],
available
at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/agp/planttreaty/agreements/smta/SMTAe.pdf. See Claudio Chiarolla,
Plant Patenting, Benefit Sharing and the Law Applicable to the Food and Agriculture
Organisation Standard Material Transfer Agreement, 11 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 1
(2008); Charles Lawson, Intellectual Property and the Material Transfer Agreement
under the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 31
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 244, 244–45 (2009).
211. ITPGRFA, supra note 145, art. 19, ¶ 3(f), art. 6, ¶¶ 7, 8; SMTA, supra note 210,
annex 2.
212. SMTA, supra note 210, art. 6, ¶ 11, annexes 3–4.
213. ITPGRFA, supra note 145, art. 13.
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Therefore, the ITPGRFA provides a workable model for MGRs and a
useful compromise for the drafting of a specific legal regime.214 The obligations established by the ITPGRFA, if applied with the necessary adjustments to MGRs, would guarantee that the prior and informed consent
and the fair and equitable benefit-sharing obligations are enforced. Firstly, creating a centralized system, such as the Multilateral System, appointed with the task of overseeing the access to MGRs and the equitable
sharing of the benefits arising from the commercialization of the products based on them, would guarantee that equitable outcomes are
reached. In contrast to the mutually agreed-upon terms required by the
CBD, the content of which is left to the discretion of the parties, the
standardization of the material transfer agreements and their negotiations
under competent authority supervision, such as the Governing Body,
would ensure that equitable results are obtained.215 Secondly, following
the position of those who propose that “the benefits associated with the
exploitation of genetic resources of the deep sea could be shared by establishing a form of trust fund from royalties or other fees collected from
developers of biotechnology derived from hydrothermal vents on the
high seas,”216 a “trust fund” for payments received could be instituted as
a means for guaranteeing the enforcement of the benefit-sharing obligation.

214. According to the concluding remarks presented by the co-chairpersons of Informal Working Group, “practical measures to address the conservation and sustainable use
of marine genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction should be studied, without prejudice to ongoing discussions on their relevant legal regime.” Ad Hoc OpenEnded Informal Working Group to Study Issues relating to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity Beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction, Remarks
transmitted by letter dated May 15, 2008 from Co-Chairpersons appointed pursuant to
resolution 62/215 (2007) to the President of the General Assembly, ¶¶ 39, 54(e), U.N.
Doc. A/63/79 (May 16, 2008). To this extent, a proposal had been endorsed also by the
European Union and its member states, noting that “it is important to take note of the
Multilateral System established by the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture.” U.N. Working Group, EU Intervention on Agenda Item 5.g,
supra note 144, at 2. The point is dealt with also by the “Report on Oceans and Law of
the Sea,” which extensively describes the FAO Treaty’s objectives and obligations. See
Oceans and the Law of the Sea, supra note 85, ¶¶ 112–13.
215. ITPGRFA, supra note 145, art. 12, ¶ 4.
216. LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LAW & DEEP SEA GENETIC RESOURCES, supra note 39, at
176.
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B. Institutional Solutions
1. Attributing a Primary Role to the Authority
The legal solutions call for an institutional mechanism that has competence over the MGRs in areas beyond national jurisdiction and that can
take the role of “national state” for application of CBD principles and to
the eventual entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol. Some suggest that
the Authority should be the governing international body for MGRs.217
Due to the fact that the commercial value of MGRs was unknown by
UNCLOS negotiators and that in 1970 the U.N. General Assembly declared all the Area the common heritage of mankind beyond its mineral
resources, MGRs can thus fall within the common heritage regime.218
This “dynamic” interpretation of UNCLOS would be in conformity with
the principles embodied in the preamble of the convention. However, as
demonstrated above, the common heritage regime provided by Part XI
applies only to MGRs located on the soil of the Area; the MGRs located
in the water column cannot come within such legal framework. This distinction leads to a confusion when attempting to create a comprehensive
legal regime because, firstly, the distinction between MGRs on the floor
or in the subsoil of the Area and those in the water column is not easy,
and secondly, retaining the differentiation based on location would create
a fragmented legal regime rather than a unique regime addressing MGRs
in their entirety.
To address this complication, an amendment that would support a dynamic interpretation of UNCLOS text as far as the mandate of the Authority is concerned has been suggested.219 As it stands, the composition
of the Authority is oriented towards the mineral industry.220 A change in
the Authority’s makeup has to be decided either by amendment or
through a second agreement for the implementation of Part XI.221 This
would demand an unlikely diplomatic effort in light of the contrasting
positions supported by UNCLOS states parties and the above mentioned
217. Louise A. de La Fayette, Commentary, Institutional Arrangements for the Legal
Regime Governing Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction – Commentary on Tullio Scovazzi, in THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME, supra note 43, at 79.
218. Id.
219. “Nothing prevents States from expanding the mining focus of the ISA and granting to it some broader management competences within the Area.” See Scovazzi, Seabed
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, supra note 47, at 59.
220. Treves, supra note 43, at 13–14.
221. See Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, adopted on July 28, 1994, 1896
U.N.T.S. 41 (140 UNCLOS states parties are also parties to this Agreement).
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doctrinal debates on MGRs’ legal status. Moreover, such a solution
would also exclude states that are not parties to UNCLOS, but who still
have an interest in MGRs. Conversely, it might induce nonparties to ratify the convention. In terms of institutional economics, this solution is
interesting because it builds on an existing system and an existing structure.
However, the Authority is not party to the CBD and cannot become
one; according to Article 34, only states and regional economic integration organizations can become parties.222 For the time being, it is the only
existing body having some jurisdiction in the field of MGRs and, in particular, it has the right and duty to “adopt appropriate rules, regulations
and procedures for inter alia . . . the protection and conservation of the
natural resources of the Area and the prevention of damage to the flora
and fauna of the marine environment.”223 However, the Authority is
called upon to play a role in assessing the environmental impact of activities and processes only in the Area, and as such, the water column
still remains outside its authority.
Nevertheless, mining activities may have an impact on ecosystems in
the Area and thus on MGRs.224 Stakeholders interested in the exploitation of such resources (both states and private actors) should support the
involvement of the Authority in the concrete management of the MGRs,
which by default implies its involvement in the broader debate.225 The
Authority, with its competences and co-operative role,226 should be one
of the institutions called upon to manage the exploitation of MGRs.
Problems of coordination between international institutions may still
arise because of possible overlaps of control. The Nagoya Protocol offers
a suitable, even if weak, solution, in stating that “[d]ue regard should be
paid to useful and relevant ongoing work or practices under [other international instruments relevant to this Protocol] and relevant international
organizations.”227 For creating and implementing a Global Multilateral
Benefit-Sharing Mechanism for MGRs, parties would have to take into
consideration the work and practices of the Authority.228
222. CBD, supra note 15, art. 34, ¶ 1.
223. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 145.
224. Tullio Scovazzi, Mining, Protection of the Environment, Scientific Research and
Bioprospecting: Some Considerations on the Role of the International Sea-Bed Authority,
19 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 383 (2004) [hereinafter Scovazzi, Mining, Protection
of the Environment, Scientific Research and Bioprospecting].
225. Matz-Lück, supra note 113, at 72; Scovazzi, supra note 224, at 399–407.
226. Scovazzi, Mining, Protection of the Environment, Scientific Research and Bioprospecting, supra note 224, at 407–08.
227. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 109, art. 4, ¶ 3 (emphasis added).
228. Id. art. 10.

2011]

TRIPS ON THE HIGH SEAS

229

Some more problems may however come up when not all the parties to
one agreement (for instance a future agreement on MGRs) are parties to
other agreements (including CBD, UNCLOS, or TRIPS). An intersystemic approach and a systemic interpretation of the relevant provisions might then be the solution.
2. Implementation Agreements or Management Convention Alternatives
Two alternative options exist in which the Authority is part of the debate but not “the one and only” for the management of MGRs. Firstly,
states could adopt an implementation agreement, following the example
of the 1995 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
December 10, 1982, relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (“Straddling
Stocks Agreement”).229 A second option would be the adoption of an ad
hoc convention for the management and the protection of MGRs in areas
beyond national jurisdiction. Both solutions are supported by the Nagoya
Protocol which asks future parties to consider “the need for and modalities of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism to address the fair
and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the utilization of genetic
resources . . . for which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed
consent.”230 A specialized instrument might contain such a mechanism
and would likewise be consistent with the Nagoya Protocol.231
(a) The Possibility of an Implementation Agreement
Some authors suggest studying the Area regime and the Straddling
Stocks Agreement in parallel, in order to delineate a feasible and viable
regime for MGRs in areas beyond national jurisdiction.232 Both regimes
are leges speciales in respect to the high seas general regime in the sense

229. United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of December 10, 1982, relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,
opened for signature Dec. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 11, 2001)
[hereinafter Straddling Stocks Agreement]. Seventy-seven UNCLOS parties have also
ratified the Straddling Stocks Agreement. See Chronological Lists of Ratifications of,
Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements as at June 3,
2011, U.N.,
http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm (last
updated June 3, 2011).
230. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 109, art. 10.
231. Id. art. 4, ¶¶ 2–4.
232. Treves, supra note 43, at 13–15.
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that the latter does not apply when the former does. Moreover, they both
deal with the management, protection, and exploitation of natural resources and both create systems of control based on international institutions. However, the Straddling Stocks Agreement relies on sub-regional
and regional organizations differing from the Area centralized system.
Considering that MGRs are renewable resources, and that their variety
might be better protected at a regional or sub-regional level, the Straddling Stocks Agreement option is of some interest. It presents a pragmatic solution as it depends on regional organizations, and would hopefully
guarantee an effective protection due to the proximity of the competent
organ with both the MGRs and the state or private actor interested in
their exploitation. This option can also have lower costs for coastal states
of regional seas where governance bodies already exist. This is perfectly
in line with Recommendation XI/8 of the SBSTTA,233 which:
urges Parties and other States to cooperate within the relevant international and/or regional organizations in order to promote the conservation, management and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas
beyond national jurisdiction, including deep seabed genetic resources.234

Presumably, this solution would also promote a direct involvement of
the industry and private actors that operate in the considered regional
area. Consequently, this solution could better promote the particular interests of a region.
However, some drawbacks of such a decentralized system persist. In
particular, protection regimes could become unduly fragmented. Compliance with and enforcement of international obligations would be entrusted to a regional or sub-regional body through the conclusion of an
agreement by the interested states. The powers given to this body can
vary in strength and the means allocated likewise can vary in efficiency
for guaranteeing the protection of MGRs. This possible fragmentation of
protection could undermine the “common” dimension of MGRs management and exploitation in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
(b) Creating a Convention for the Management and Protection of MGRs
Another possibility is the creation of a unified regime for MGRs beyond national borders by an ad hoc agreement that regulates all the rele233. SBSTTA, supra note 137. Part of the role of the SBSTTA as an advisory board is
to provide the Conference of the Parties of the CBD and its other subsidiary bodies with
timely advice relating to the implementation of the Convention in the form of recommendations.
234. SBSTTA, supra note 137, ¶ 4(f).
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vant aspects (protection, management, and exploitation). This agreement
would also create an institution, such as an international organization, to
take charge of enforcement. This new agreement would be a sort of
“CBD for MGRs.” It would complement the actual CBD and UNCLOS
by providing a unique regime for MGRs, independent of their location in
the water column or on the Area, and by guaranteeing machinery similar
to the Authority but open to representation by other interests.
The creation of a centralized body by the ad hoc agreement would establish an authority in charge of granting access to and managing the
benefit sharing among states and private actors interested in activities
beyond national jurisdiction. This new institution could be a Multilateral
System for MGRs, inspired by the FAO example mentioned above. The
main difference with the FAO Multilateral System would be that this
new institution would also be party to agreements regulating the activities concluded with states party or private investors. Thus, all contracts
should have a “public” dimension in the interest of including the participation of this institution. Accordingly, the new machinery should be
closer to the Area regime than the FAO Multilateral System concerning
the contractual aspects.
The creation of a centralized body has the advantage of guaranteeing
uniform protection and uniform standards for the exploitation of MGRs.
In theory, it would guarantee a “common” management of the MGRs,
less influenced by particular or regional interests. The establishment of
such an institution and machinery would, however, come at an economical cost for state parties. The conclusion of such an agreement would be
reached only after a determination of the commercial worth of biotech
products deriving from MGRs. Only then is it likely that states would be
keen to regulate their protection and management and determine their
legal status and common use.
It is also necessary to consider that this agreement would be situated in
an already crowded legal environment; its links and relationships with
the other instruments would have to be discussed and regulated. In particular, it would be useful to create links with the CBD, UNCLOS, and
TRIPS to create “legal gateways” between the texts (compatibility clauses and, eventually, recalls of the existing agreements in the new one) and
links between the regimes. The latter suggestion could consist, for example, of a system for the exchange of information and data between the
technical organs of each regime or in a mechanism for the participation
of technical organs of one regime in the meetings of the others.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The first part demonstrates how several legal instruments overlap when
it comes to the governance of MGRs. While they stand in a relationship
of interdependence, also of complementarity and mutual support, they
manage MGRs inadequately and inefficiently. That is the reason why an
ad hoc regime for the management and exploitation of MGRs should be
adopted.
To the extent that MGRs are considered to be global commons (if not
part of the common heritage of mankind) ethical and moral concerns
cannot be left out and ought to be taken into consideration in the creation
of a regulatory framework for MGRs and their exploitation.235 As it
stands, the law of the sea plays the role of “equalizer” among maritime
nations of the world.236 UNCLOS specifically creates mechanisms for
balancing interests and sometimes redistributing benefits deriving from
maritime economic activities.237 Therefore, any future legal regime for
MGRs cannot ignore the role of the law of the sea.
Each solution explored above brings with it useful features for putting
together the future regime. One main conclusion can be drawn: a compromise between IPRs’ protection and MGRs’ management can only be
realized via a new instrument, either a protocol or an annex to an existing
instrument, or an ad hoc agreement, creating an institutional machinery
for guaranteeing prior and informed access to MGRs and fair and equitable benefit sharing. It might in the end indeed be suitable to have a
“common heritage without mentioning it.” 238

235. Leary, on the contrary, prefers to leave the debate behind, fearing the delay in the
creation of a new legal regime by focusing on pointless debates. See LEARY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW & DEEP SEA GENETIC RESOURCES, supra note 39, at 100.
236. Jay L Batongbacal, The Law of the Sea, Marine Technology and Global Social
Justice, in THE FUTURE OF OCEAN REGIME-BUILDING, ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO DOUGLAS M.
JOHNSTON 105, 116 (Aldo Chircop et al. eds., 2009).
237. See also UNCLOS, supra note 14, arts. 87, 124–91, speaking to the freedoms of
the high seas, the right of access of land-locked states to and from the sea and freedom of
transit, the regime of the Area.
238. See Treves, Principles and Objectives, supra note 43, at 23.

